Discrimination, Retaliation,Title VI, TitleVII, Title IX, KKK ACT, Equal Opportunity Employment, Attorney Fraud, Extrinsic Fraud, Fraud Upon The Court, Deprivation of Due Process and Equal Protection of the Law

TITLE VI TITLEVII.ORG TITLE IX

Dr. Martin Luther King: "Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere."

State courts of some 39 states are described in Republican Party of Minnesota Et Al. v. White, Chairperson, Minnesota Board of Judicial Standards, et al. 536 U.S. 765 790 (2001),

“Barnhizer, "On the Make": Campaign Funding and the Corrupting of the American Judiciary, 50 Cath. U. L. Rev. 361, 379 (2001) (relating anecdotes of lawyers who felt that their contributions to judicial campaigns affected their chance of success in court). Despite these significant problems, 39 States currently employ some form of judicial elections for their appellate courts, general jurisdiction trial courts, or both. American Judicature Society, Judicial Selection in the States: Appellate and General Jurisdiction Courts (Apr. 2002). ”

Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 175 (1961), Ku Klux Klan Act => Mr. Lowe of Kansas said:

"Combinations, darker than the night that hides them, conspiracies, wicked as the worst of felons could devise, have gone unwhipped of justice. Immunity is given to crime, and the records of the public tribunals are searched in vain for any evidence of effective redress."

In February 2005, federally funded University and Attorney Susan Westover with CSU Office of General Counsel fraudulently accused SDSU’s in-house Office of Diversity & Equity, Equal Opportunity Specialist, Janice M. Taylor, a law school graduate, of unlawfully destroying all her case files that were supposed to be safely kept for 2 years, including Plaintiff’s April 10, 2003 complaint and subsequent investigation file regarding gender discrimination against a highly qualified female applicant with 28 patents, 40 journal papers and 100 conference papers. Title VI, Title VII, Title IX and Cal. Gov. Code 12940/12946 evidence was unlawfully destroyed.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RAHUL SINGH,                                                          CASE NO. 08-56131
       Plaintiff – Appellant,                                               D.C. No. 3:07-cv-1615-DMS-BLM

vs.

CHARLES REED, DAVID T. HAYHURST,
JEREMY GOLDEN, JOEL C. GOLDEN,
NANCY A. MARLIN,STEPHEN WEBER,
SUSAN WESTOVER,
        Defendants – Appellees.

APPELLANT’S INFORMAL BRIEF

1. Jurisdiction

a. Timeliness of Appeal or Petition:
(i) Date of entry of judgment and order
of lower court: May 29, 2008.
(ii) Date of service of any motion made after judgment
(other than for fees and costs): June 12, 2008.
(iii) Date of entry of order deciding motion: July 17, 2008.
(iv) Date notice of appeal filed: June 27, 2008 and amended July 22, 2008.

b. IF POSSIBLE, PLEASE ATTACH ONE COPY OF EACH OF THE FOLLOWING:
(1) The orders from which you are appealing => Exhibits 1 + 2.
(2) The district court’s entry of judgment => Exhibit 3.
(3) The district court docket sheet => Exhibit 4.

(*) Exhibit 51 submitted August 14, 2007 with Complaint has been removed from district courts docket and hence is attached to this brief as Exhibit 5. Exhibit 51 of Complaint is a Xeroxed B&W copy of fraudulent evidence fabricated by Officers of Court and Defendants who intentionally discriminate and engage in Ku Klux Klannish conduct.

2. What are the facts of your case?

I, an American, have been deprived of a full and fair opportunity to litigate. Barriers operate to favor whites. I have a right to judges and courts that do not think like or serve perpetrators of Ku Klux Klannish conduct. I should have been reinstated with tenure and promotion at the August 12, 2005 summary judgment held at Superior Court of California, San Diego.

To summarize, I joined San Diego State University (SDSU) in August of 1998. SDSU is part of the California State University (CSU). I at all times competently performed my duties and obligations at SDSU, leading to research on the cutting edge of technology and the College of Engineering Outstanding Teacher Award. (Complaint, Par. 22). I was recommended for both tenure and promotion by my Department, my College and my University’s Promotions and Tenure Review Panel, (Exhibit 3 of Complaint),

"March 22, 2004

Professor Rahul Singh
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
College of Engineering

Dear Professor Singh:

The University Promotions and Tenure Review Panel has completed its review of your PDS and One-of-a-kind file for tenure and promotion to Associate Professor. We are pleased to inform you that we recommend your promotion to the rank of Associate Professor with the awarding of tenure.

We believe promotion to Associate Professor to be the University's express recognition of the following: first, that one is an effective teacher; second, that one has contributed significantly to the scholarship in one's field; and finally, that one has readily served the University and community beyond the classroom.

Tenure is the University's express recognition that one's accomplishments in all three areas of professional involvement assure reasonable promise of continued, significant contribution to the academy and to the University.

You have the right to submit a rebuttal statement or a response in writing to this recommendation. If you choose to do so, it should be addressed to the Panel and must be received by the Office of Faculty Affairs (CH-3310) no later than march 29, 2004.

As your peers and colleagues, we congratulate you on your accomplishments and wish you continued professional success.

Sincerely,

University Promotions and Tenure Review Panel (2003-2004)

s/ Terry Cronan

Terry Cronan, Chair                        Jay Harris
Peter Anderson                       Brian Loveman
Nadine Bezuk                       Gene Whittenburg
Sergio Elizondo                         Winnie Willis ..."

According to my contract, Defendant and President Stephen Weber needed compelling reasons to terminate me against the wishes of a well informed 8 member University Promotions and Tenure Review Panel, (Exhibit 2 of Complaint),

“If this final decision is for non-reappointment or reappointment for a terminal year, the President's written communication shall include a detailed statement of the compelling reasons for differing with the Panel's recommendation.”

Instead of assisting and conniving at fraud and intentional discrimination, federally funded Defendant Weber should have terminated Defendants Marlin and Hayhurst. Defendant Weber is also in charge of SDSU’s Office of Diversity & Equity. Provost Marlin was aware that Dean Hayhurst had received a vote of no confidence from the faculty at the University of South Alabama prior to hiring him. Despite knowing this Provost Marlin selected him out of five candidates, including a female and a part Hispanic. Provost Marlin at pg. 45 of her June 30, 2005 deposition,

“Q. Were you aware at the time you hired him that he had been given a vote of no confidence at South Alabama University?

Yes.”

The recipient of the College of Engineering Outstanding Teacher Award was terminated in May of 2004 in retaliation for opposing discrimination. Details were provided in my affidavit given in Exhibit 38 of Complaint. At the end of April 2004, Dean Hayhurst and Provost Marlin exchanged sham emails regarding my performance. Oddly Provost did not correct Dean Hayhurst with regards to nonsense written by him in his email regarding my performance. Provost boasts of being a thorough and independent reviewer. Oddly Provost did not write Dean Hayhurst back as to explain what he meant that my teaching evaluations are nothing special? Provost had my teaching evaluations right in front of her, where students wrote, (Exhibit 38 of Complaint),

“Best Lecturer/Teacher I've had at SDSU. A pleasure to attend class. Learned a lot.”

“The lectures were very clear, organized and the teacher's ability to make the class interesting was noticeable. Dr. Singh its been my real great honor to be your student and I wish you all the best of luck in your life. You have taught me a lot and has been one of the only teachers whom I felt cares about teaching his students and guide them in a positive way (direct). Thank you so very much for everything you have done. live your life happily.”

“Dr. Singh you are a great instructor. Honestly you are the only instructor. I actually learned a lot from you. Thank you for everything. (Lakers will repeat for the 4th time). Good Luck.”

“Singh is in the top 2 professors that I have had in 5 years at this school. Good teaching style, Mellow.”

“I have never had an instructor willing to spend more time helping students.”

“Dr. Singh was always available and helpful, I learned more in this class than any other class.”

“Thanks for being very helpful during office hours. I learned a lot though you challenged my/our abilities and knowledge. Good luck and see you around. Good Job !”

“One of the best teacher at SDSU.”

Discrimination & Retaliation: Title IX

On April 10, 2003, I had complained to Equal Opportunity Specialist at SDSU’s Office of Diversity and Equity, Ms. Janice M. Taylor, that SDSU was discriminating against a highly qualified Computer Engineering Female Applicant with 40 journal publications, 100 conference publications, 28 patents and an excellent match to the job description because she was a female.

I had complained to Ms. Taylor that the female applicant had superior qualifications over the 4 candidates invited for on-campus interviews, of which none was a female. I complained to Ms. Taylor that one of the male candidates, a friend of the Associate Dean of the College of Engineering was not even a computer engineer and that another male candidate “Jerry” was interviewed almost a month after I had informed my department of the highly qualified female applicant.

The female applicant was the most qualified for the position in question, i.e., the Pine Chair in Computer Engineering. Ms. Taylor asked for my help in the investigation. Federally funded University was forced to invite female applicant for an interview. The investigation was quite malevolent. Ms. Taylor worked for the Office of Diversity & Equity reporting to both Defendant/President Weber and Defendant/Provost Marlin. Ms. Taylor quit SDSU in September 2003. I was terminated in May 2004. I hired Attorneys Joel and Jeremy Golden in summer 2004 and at that time gave them a red colored official SDSU Handbook regarding Office of Diversity & Equity procedures which stated that records were to be kept by the Office of Diversity and Equity (ODE) for 2 years. After communicating with Defendants, my Attorneys filed the lawsuit in Superior Court of California under Cal. Gov. Code 12940(h) and 8547.12(c). It was filed in October 2004.

In February 2005, federally funded University and Attorney Susan Westover with CSU Office of General Counsel fraudulently accused SDSU’s in-house Office of Diversity & Equity, Equal Opportunity Specialist, Janice M. Taylor, a law school graduate, of unlawfully destroying all her case files that were supposed to be safely kept for 2 years, including my April 10, 2003, complaint and subsequent investigation file regarding gender discrimination against the highly qualified female applicant with 28 patents, 40 journal papers and 100 conference papers. Title VI, Title VII, Title IX and Cal. Gov. Code 12940/12946 evidence was unlawfully destroyed.

In February 2005, Ms. Taylor quit her employment as professor of law at National University and went into hiding.

Exhibit 11 of Complaint, Doc. No. 1, shows page 7 of February 2005 CSU’S REPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DOCUMENTS, SET ONE,

“Request for Production No. 16:

All documents regarding or referring to any review or investigation of Plaintiff’s Claims.

Response to Request for Production No. 16:

Objection. Seeks documents protected from disclosure by the attorney client privilege and attorney work product doctrine (including the files of CSU’s Office of General Counsel, which has investigated Plaintiff’s claims in the course of the governmental claim and litigation). Subject to and without waiving these objections, CSU responds as follows: The only relevant non-privileged investigation materials would be those involving the Pine Chair search. However, when Janice Taylor left her employment at SDSU, she apparently took with her or otherwise disposed of all her case files, and left no documentation at SDSU. Thus, despite a diligent search and reasonable inquiry, CSU is unable to comply with this request, since the documents are no longer in CSU’s possession, custody, or control.”

Exhibit 10 of the Complaint, Doc. No. 1, shows page 3 of February 2005 CSU’S REPONSE TO REQUEST FOR DOCUMENTS, SET ONE,

“Request for Production No. 4:

All documents evidencing any and all cases or investigations involving Equal Opportunity Specialist, Janice Taylor, regardless of the significance of her participation.

Response to Request for Production No. 4:

Objection. Seeks documents that are inadmissible, irrelevant, and not reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence. Violates constitutional privacy rights of persons involved in investigations. Unduly burdensome. Constitutes unwarranted annoyance, embarrassment, and oppression. Subject to and without waiving these objections, CSU responds as follows: The only relevant investigation materials would be those involving the Pine Chair Search. However, when Ms. Taylor left her employment at SDSU, she apparently took with her or otherwise disposed of all her case files, and left no documentation at SDSU. Thus, despite a diligent search and reasonable inquiry, CSU is unable to comply with this request, since the documents are no longer in CSU’s possession, custody, or control.

Request for Production No. 5:

All documents that evidence the current contact information for Janice Taylor.

Response to Request for Production No. 5

Objection. Invades personal privacy rights of Janice Taylor in her personal file documents. Should have been propounded as an interrogatory. Subject to and without waiving these objections, CSU responds as follows: Plaintiff is not entitled to documents from Janice Taylor’s personnel file. Janice Taylor’s last known address and telephone number are 11837 La Colina Road, San Diego, CA 92131; (858) 566-3244.”

The case should have been over at the August 12, 2005 summary judgment. The recipient of the College of Engineering Outstanding Teacher award should have been reinstated with tenure and promotion at that time, in tune with a) his department, b) his college, c) his University Promotions, Tenure and Review Panel, d) his contract, and e) Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000) at page 147,

“… it is permissible for the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of discrimination from the falsity of the employer's explanation. Specifically, we stated:

"The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination. Thus, rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination." Id., at 511.

Proof that the defendant's explanation is unworthy of credence is simply one form of circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination, and it may be quite persuasive. See id., at 517 ("[P]roving the employer's reason false becomes part of (and often considerably assists) the greater enterprise of proving that the real reason was intentional discrimination"). In appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact can reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose. Such an inference is consistent with the general principle of evidence law that the factfinder is entitled to consider a party's dishonesty about a material fact as "affirmative evidence of guilt." Wright v. West, 505 U. S. 277, 296 (1992);”

Judge Patricia Cowett, instead of reinstatement, decided that I owed some 5000.00 dollars to federally funded University that destroyed Cal. Gov. Code 12940/12946, Title VI, VII & IX evidence. Intentional discrimination was rewarded. A wicked conspiracy.

Discrimination & Retaliation: Title VI

My Complaint, Doc. 1, at Paragraph 27 indicates that at the end of February 2005, discovery documents exchanged with regards to Singh I revealed that a letter written by me in March 2003 complaining of discrimination by Dean David Hayhurst against me was secretly placed in my personnel file. Attorney Golden deceitfully told me that he planned on amending the complaint at TRIAL scheduled to take place around September 16, 2005. It should have been done prior to August 12, 2005. My Attorneys attempted to lose August 12, 2005 Summary Judgment. Because of criminal acts this had to be filed as Singh II (Superior Court Case GIC 880565.) Exhibit 7 of the Complaint shows my Discrimination Complaint filed with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing on February 23, 2006.

The “color” box is checked in the Discrimination Complaint, see Exhibit 7 of Complaint. I had discussed discrimination by Dean Hayhurst against me with Whistle-blower officer Dr. Popp. I had also informed my faculty union about discrimination by Dean Hayhurst against me. The Union and Whistle-blower officer Dr. Popp stay in touch. Whistle-blower officer Dr. Popp reports directly to Defendant Nancy Marlin and Defendant Stephen Weber.

I filed Singh II on February 21, 2007 and Superior Court assigned Judge Richard Strauss. The appeal from Singh I was pending in the California Court of Appeal to be remanded back to Superior Court. Whistle-blower officer Dr. Popp, on June 29, 2005, stated under oath that I was the top candidate in the college of engineering, (Popp Dep., pgs. 40-41,)

Q. Were you aware of the fact that Dr. Singh was the top candidate in the college, the only one recommended by the college committee for tenure and promotion at the time the dean wrote his letter?

MS. WESTOVER: Compound. Ambiguous as to top candidate.

THE WITNESS: In 2003, yeah, I was. I would follow the recommendations of each of the levels of review.

BY MR. GOLDEN:

Q. Do you remember making a statement to him that he would burn bridges, or something to that effect, if he turned in the letter as it was?

A. I can – I did mention to him that I thought there was some pretty – I ’m not sure if I used the phrase burning bridges, but I did suggest to him that the language and the accusations in the paragraphs that I indicated to you earlier were serious accusations, and that’s why I felt he ought to reconsider. Accusing the dean of discrimination is a serious allegation. It should not be taken lightly, in my opinion.

Ms. Taylor’s files also included her meeting with Whistle-Blower Officer Dr. Popp and Defendant Dean Hayhurst after Dr. Popp felt that accusing the dean of discrimination is a serious allegation. Whites were granted early tenure and promotion even though the granting was without enthusiasm. The investigation was quite malevolent. ODE Equal Opportunity Specialist, law graduate Ms. Taylor was dishonestly and fraudulently accused of destroying all her files. Ms. Taylor was further accused of deleting all her emails, changing her passwords etc. etc. The case should have been over at the August 12, 2005 summary judgment. The recipient of the College of Engineering Outstanding Teacher award should have been reinstated with tenure and promotion at that time, in tune with a) his department, b) his college, c) his University Promotions, Tenure and Review Panel, d) his contract, and e) Reeves, 530 U.S. 133 147 (2000).

Instead, intentional discrimination was rewarded. The objectives of Congress in the enactment of various Acts are plain from the language of the statutes: It is to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other employees. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429, (1971).

Additional Deprivation of Full and Fair Opportunity to Litigate

Attorneys Joel Golden and Jeremy Golden had fraudulently abandoned me at Summary Judgment. I was also discouraged from including an affidavit to defeat Summary Judgment. I fired Attorneys Joel Golden and Jeremy Golden. Afterwards on September 15, 2005, my material was returned to me except that Attorneys Joel and Jeremy Golden in collaboration with Attorney Westover and Defendants kept/stole my red colored official SDSU Handbook regarding Office of Diversity & Equity procedures which stated that records were to be kept by the Office of Diversity and Equity (ODE) for 2 years. Attorney Golden had not exchanged this document in discovery despite my requests. Attorney Golden had deceitfully reasoned that he did not want Defendant to know that they had this document and that he was concealing it from Defendant for possible impeachment at trial. Defendants and their Attorneys in unlawful fraudulent collusion with my Attorneys had been conniving at my defeat, conceiving and fabricating fraudulent evidence, i.e., a fraudulent red handbook stating that search records should be kept for 1 year. My Attorneys removed my distinct sticky markers from my red Handbook and placed them in the fraudulently fabricated Handbook. On September 15, 2005, my material returned to me contained the fraudulently fabricated red Handbook.

Federally funded Defendants and Attorney Westover had also perpetrated fraud upon the court by fraudulently accusing Office of Diversity & Equity Equal Opportunity Specialist Ms. Taylor of destroying Title VI, Title VII, Title IX and Cal. Gov. Code 12940/12946 evidence. On September 26, 2005, Judge Cowett was not willing to give me an opportunity to be heard. Judge Cowett quashed the trial subpoena for Ms. Taylor and forbade any other means of extracting information from Ms. Taylor. The transcript for the September 26, 2005 hearing, (Exhibit 23 of Complaint),

“DR. SINGH: RAHUL SINGH, PLAINTIFF

MS. WESTOVER: SUSAN WESTOVER FOR THE UNIVERSITY

COURT: OKAY. MR. SINGH, YOU ARE NOW PRO PER; IS THAT MY CORRECT UNDERSTANDING?

DR. SINGH: YES.

COURT: OKAY. MS. TAYLOR’S DEPOSITION WAS ALREADY TAKEN BY VIDEOTAPE; CORRECT? HAS THAT OCCURRED?

MS. WESTOVER: YES.

DR. SINGH: YES.

COURT: AND A PERSON IS ONLY REQUIRED TO SUBMIT TO DEPOSITION ONES UNLESS THERE IS SOME COMPELLING REASON WHY NEW ISSUES HAVE ARISEN SINCE THE DEPO, WHICH I DON’T BELIEVE HAVE; SO SHE IS NOT SUBJECT TO BEING DEPOSED AGAIN BY YOU. I SEE NOTHING INADEQUATE ABOUT THE PROCEDURE UNDER WHICH THE DEPOSITION WAS TAKEN ALREADY;
AND, TWO, THE REASON THAT WE ALLOWED FOR THE VIDEOTAPE WAS TO ACCOMMODATE HER PREVIOUSLY DISCLOSED VACATION DURING THE TRIAL SO THAT WE WOULD VERY A RECORD THAT COULD BE SHOWN TO THE JURY OR TO THE TRIER OF FACT DURING THE TRIAL SO SHE CERTAINELY HAS A RIGHT TO CONTINUE TO GO ON THAT VACATION. AND NO, I WILL NOT ALLOW HER TO BE SUBPOENAED AND REQUIRED TO COME TO TRIAL BECAUSE HER DEPOSITION HAS BEEN TAKEN. THAT’S THE WHOLE PURPOSE.

MS. WESTOVER: SHE’S NOT JUST TAKING VACATION. SHE IS MOVING THERE.

COURT: WELL, WHATEVER THE REASON.

MS. WESTOVER: NOW, HE IS TRYING TO SLAP HER WITH A SUBPOENA FOR TRIAL, AND SHE IS ABSOLUTELY FREAKING OUT BECAUSE SHE IS MOVING.

COURT: THAT’S NOT APPROPRIATE, SIR.

DR. SINGH: OKAY. WELL, YOUR HONOR, ONE DAY’S A DEPOSITION AND THEN CAN HAVE LIKE AN OPPORTUNITY TO RE-EXAMINE HER.

COURT: YOU CAN ASK HER SUPPLEMENTAL QUESTIONS BY WAY OF INTERROGATORIES IF THERE ARE NEW ISSUES YOU WANT TO ASK HER ABOUT, BUT YOU CAN’T DEPOSE HER AGAIN.

MS. WESTOVER: SHE IS NOT A PARTY

COURT: AND SHE’S NOT A PARTY. YOU COULDN’T ASK HER QUESTIONS EITHER.

MS. WESTOVER: THAT’S RIGHT.

DR. SINGH: WELL, I FELT THAT – – THAT I WASN’T REALLY BEING REPRESENTED BY MY – –

COURT: BUT THE REMEDY FOR THAT IS NOT TAKING THE DEPOSITION OF THE WITNESS AGAIN, EVEN IF IT WERE TRUE, WHICH I WILL ASSUMING JUST FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT. SO THAT EXPLAINS WHAT YOUR REQUESTING IS NOT APPROPRIATE, SIR.
ALL RIGHT. THANK YOU.

MS. WESTOVER: THANK YOU.

DR. SINGH: YOUR HONOR, JUST LIKE YOU SAID, UNLESS SOME NEW CIRCUMSTANCES COME TO LIGHT – –

COURT: RIGHT. WELL, AND I CAN’T IMAGINE THAT THEY HAVE IN THIS CASE BECAUSE HER TESTIMONY WOULD RELATE TO THINGS THAT OCCURRED IN THE PAST SO NOTHING NEW – – THERE HASN’T BEEN ANY NEW CONTACT THAT WOULD CREATE A NEW ISSUE.

MS. WESTOVER: SHE STOPPED WORKING FOR THE UNIVERSITY IN THE FALL OF 2003.

COURT: OKAY. THANK YOU.

MS. WESTOVER: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.”

(PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED)

On October 10, 2005, in hiding unlawful fraudulent collusion with my Attorneys, including stealing of evidence and fabrication of fraudulent evidence by Attorneys in collaboration with Defendants, Attorney Susan Westover committed perjury to Judge Cowett. In response to my October 7, 2005 declaration, Attorney Westover perjured in her declaration to Judge Cowett, (Exhibit 14 of Complaint),

"DECLARATION OF SUSAN WESTOVER

I, Susan Westover, declare as follows:

1. I am an attorney licensed to practice in the State of California and I am University Counsel with the Office of General Counsel for the California State University. In that capacity I represent defendant Board of Trustees of the California State University. If called upon to testify, I could and would competently testify to the following matters, of which I have personal knowledge.

2. In his motion in limine, plaintiff claims that his lawyer may have tampered with the evidence by taking plaintiff’s “red SDSU faculty recruitment and hiring procedures handbook” and swapping it for another version. Since 1999, there have only been two versions of that handbook. The one that governed the Pine Chair search involved in this case is the version issued in 1999 (and the one included in the trial exhibits as Exhibit No. 170). While the handbook was recently updated in 2004, that version is irrelevant here, since this search took place in 2003. In any event, I have had no exchanges of information with Joel Golden regarding this particular document, and find it hard to believe that Mr. Golden somehow got an extra copy of a different version of the red handbook and switched it for the one that plaintiff originally had. He certainly never got any red handbooks from me.

3. In his motion, plaintiff also claims that his former counsel provided me with a list of questions to be asked of University witnesses. I have no idea what Dr. Singh is talking about, as I have never received from Mr. Golden any lists of questions for witnesses.

4. Finally, in his motion, plaintiff claims that the document entitled “SDSU Office of Diversity & Equity Procedures for Faculty Recruitment and Hiring” (July 30, 1999) (Trial Exhibit No. 170) was not exchanged during discovery. Plaintiff never asked for faculty recruitment and hiring policies or procedures during the discovery process. A true and correct of his only request for production of documents to the University is attached as Exhibit A. Notably absent is any request for such a document. Regardless, plaintiff knew of the existence of the document since he actually produced that document to the University in response its request for production to him.

I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on October 10, 2005, at Long Beach, California. …”

Attorney Westover perpetrated fraud upon the court by writing that I, the Plaintiff actually produced the red July 30, 1999 SDSU Office of Diversity & Equity Procedures for Faculty Recruitment and Hiring handbook to the University in response its request for production to him. Federally funded Dr. Charles Reed and his CSU General Counsel Westover perpetrate Ku Klux Klannish conduct and intentionally discriminate. My Attorneys in unlawful collusion with Defendants and Attorney Westover stole my red handbook. Exhibit 16 of Complaint shows Page 5 of the fraudulently fabricated red Handbook and it is provided here as best possible, (Exhibit 16, Complaint),

“PHASE 3: FINAL RECOMMENDATION AND HIRE

· Search committee interviews approved candidates.
· “Request for Approval to Negotiate” is approved by Dean and submitted to Provost for each candidate to be negotiated with. (Tab 10)
· Provost signs Academic Transaction Form (ATF). (Tab 11)
· Rejection letters may be sent. (Sample at Tab 12)
· Place all applicant and candidate files in order for storage, including all resumes.
· Search records should be kept for 1 year.

JULY 2000 5”

The fraudulently fabricated red handbook states that search records should be kept for 1 year. My red handbook that was stolen by my Attorneys was regarding Office of Diversity & Equity procedures and it stated that records were to be kept by the Office of Diversity and Equity (ODE) for 2 years. Exhibit 15 of Complaint shows that the fraudulently fabricated red handbook is titled “SDSU Faculty Recruitment and Hiring Procedures” and NOT titled “SDSU Office of Diversity & Equity Procedures for Faculty Recruitment and Hiring”. The fraudulently fabricated red handbook is a July 2000 version, and NOT July 30, 1999 version. Also see Exhibit 5 attached to this brief.

The fraudulently fabricated red handbook also dishonestly states,

““Request for Approval to Negotiate” is approved by Dean and submitted to Provost for each candidate to be negotiated with.”

In contrast, my red handbook that was stolen by my Attorneys stated,

“Dean approves the recommendation, modifies it, or asks for further information. Forwards “Request to Negotiate” form to Provost. Provost accepts recommendations, asks for further information, or rejects recommendation. Notifies Dean and ODE by copy of “Request”.”

A judge at a settlement hearing was also kept from helping me get reinstated with tenure and promotion in tune with a) my department, b) my college, c) my University Promotions and Tenure Review Panel, d) my contract and e) Reeves, 530 U.S. 133 147 (2000), which in the absence of Ku Klux Klannish conduct would have happened back at the August 12, 2005 Summary Judgment. Judge Cowett was aware that her actions or lack thereof influence outcomes. At the Oct. 13, 2005 Trial Call, I pleaded for a settlement hearing with a judge. Judge Cowett instead turned to Defendant’s Attorney Westover. Judge Cowett was not willing to give me an opportunity to be heard. Judge Cowett without hearing from me denied my plea for a settlement hearing with a judge because I was Pro Per. Judge Cowett had noted that I was agonizing on October 13, 2005 as admitted by Judge on December 2, 2005. Of course, Judge Cowett remembered it vividly; this was a case where I as a result of malicious fraudulent attorney collusion had no choice but to be Pro Per at the very last minute. My Attorneys in collaboration with Defendants and Attorney Westover had stolen my red handbook regarding Office of Diversity & Equity procedures which stated that records were to be kept by the Office of Diversity & Equity (ODE) for 2 years. My Attorneys had known that I planned on walking in to court with my red handbook as key evidence. Judge Cowett had not allowed me to be heard on Sept. 26, 2005. Judge Cowett had quashed the trial subpoena for Office of Diversity & Equity Equal Opportunity Specialist, Ms. Taylor that was dishonestly and fraudulently accused by Defendants and Westover of destroying Cal. Gov. Code 12940/12946, Title VI, Title VII, Title IX evidence. Judge Cowett forbade any other means of extracting information from Ms. Taylor. I had been told by Attorney Westover that CSU would be awarded close to 100,000.00 dollars. I already owed roughly 5000.00 dollars to federally funded University that destroyed Title VI, Title VII, Title IX, and Cal. Gov. Code 12940/12946 evidence from summary judgment as decided by Judge Cowett. Attorney Westover had cancelled witnesses (SDSU employees) prematurely to Defendant’s advantage on October 12, 2005 and Judge Cowett wanted to start trial immediately thereafter on Monday. I was going to owe Defendants roughly 100,000.00 dollars. My consent was not free on October 13, 2005. The transcript for October 13, 2005, (Exhibit 23 of Complaint),

“THE COURT: SINGH VERSUS SAN DIEGO STATE UNIVERSITY, ALSO ON THE TRIAL CALENDAR.

MS. WESTOVER: GOOD MORNING. SUSAN WESTOVER FOR DEFENDANTS.

THE COURT: THANK YOU. GOOD MORNING.

DR. SINGH: GOOD MORNING, YOUR HONOR. RAHUL SINGH, PLAINTIFF.

THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. YOU WILL NEED TO SPEAK UP SO THAT WE CAN CLEARLY HEAR WHAT YOU ARE SAYING.
YOU ARE REPRESENTING YOURSELF, PROFESSOR SINGH?

DR. SINGH: YES.

THE COURT: ARE BOTH SIDES READY FOR TRIAL?

MS. WESTOVER: WE HAMMERED OUT A SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT YESTERDAY, YOUR HONOR, AND WE ARE IN THE MIDST OF EXCHANGING DOCUMENTATION.

THE COURT: CAN YOU TELL ME BRIEFLY WHAT THE TERMS ARE.

MS. WESTOVER: YES. THE PAYMENT TO DR. SINGH – – IT’S – – IT’S VALUED AT $ 50,000. THE ORIGINAL PAYMENT WAS GOING TO BE 15,000 NOW. WE ARE GOING TO HIRE HIM BACK NEXT SEMESTER FOR ONE SEMESTER FOR A DISTINGUISHED SCHOLAR POSITION, AND WE ARE NOW JUGGLING THE MONEYS THAT WE ARE PAYING HIM MORE OF HIS SALARY UP FRONT NOW AND LESS OF HIS SALARY NEXT SEMESTER; SO WE ARE JUST TRYING TO FIND A WAY TO FIGURE OUT THE EXACT DOLLAR AMOUNTS THAT WORK WITHIN THE COLLECTIVE BARGAININNG AGREEMENT FOR THE SALARY SCHEDULES; SO AS OF YESTERDAY, IT WAS 25,000 NOW AND 25,000 NEXT SEMESTER. THIS MORNING HE HAS ASKED TO BUMP IT UP A LITTLE BIT FOR NOW AND – –

THE COURT: ARE YOU SURE YOU ARE GOING TO BE ABLE TO WORK IT OUT?

MS. WESTOVER: YES.

THE COURT: DO YOU REALLY HAVE A SETTLEMENT?

DR. SINGH: IT’S A TENTATIVE SETTLEMENT SO I WOULD STILL LIKE A SETTLEMENT HEARING WITH A JUDGE.

THE COURT: YES. I USUALLY DON’T TAKE THINGS OFF THE TRIAL CALENDAR UNLESS I HAVE SOMETHING IN WRITING INDICATING FROM BOTH SIDES THAT THE CASE HAS, IN FACT, SETTLED AND THAT THE TERMS ARE CERTAIN. SO I WOULD BE WILLING TO TRAIL YOU ON A TRIAL CALENDAR, SAY, UNTIL MONDAY. AND IF YOU COULD PRESENT TO ME EITHER THE SIGNED SETTLEMENT AND/OR A LETTER THAT YOU COULD FAX INDICATING THAT BOTH SIDES HAVE AGREED TO FIRM TERMS, I WOULD BE WILLING TO TAKE IT OFF THE TRIAL CALENDAR; OTHERWISE, I SHOULD TRAIL YOU TO MONDAY.

MS. WESTOVER: I THINK THAT’S FINE. I THINK WE SHOULD BE ABLE TO WORK OUT THE PAYROLL FOR THE NEXT – – WITHIN TODAY OR TOMORROW.

THE COURT: DR. SINGH.

DR. SINGH: IS THERE A POSSIBILITY OF HAVING IT – – SETTLEMENT HEARING WITH A JUDGE TO SEE IF – –

THE COURT: I AM NOT SURE AT THIS POINT YOU REALLY NEED THAT. DO YOU THINK YOU REALLY NEED THAT OR ARE YOU JUST CHECKING WITH YOUR FOLKS AS FAR AS JUGGLING THE TERMS WITHIN THE $50,000?

MS. WESTOVER: WE DON’T NEED IT IN TERMS OF WHAT WE ARE AGREEING ON. I THINK DR. SINGH JUST WANTS SOMEBODY’S STAMP OF APPROVAL.

THE COURT: WELL, I CERTAINELY WANT TO DO THAT. I WOULD WANT TO PUT THE SETTLEMENT ON THE RECORD HERE IF WE CAN.

DO YOU THINK THAT IF I TRAILED YOU TO THE END OF THIS CALENDAR YOU MIGHT BE ABLE TO MAKE PHONE CALLS AND HAVE THE DETAILS WRAPPED UP?

MS. WESTOVER: I DON’T THINK I CAN REACH PEOPLE.

THE COURT: WHY DON’T I TRAIL YOU AND WHY DON’T YOU SEE IF YOU CAN DO THAT, AND THEN WE WILL DECIDE.

MS. WESTOVER: I DON’T KNOW THAT ADDRESSES DR. SINGH’S CONCERN. HE WANTS A SECOND OPINION FROM A JUDGE TELLING HIM THAT IN THEIR OPINION THIS SETTLEMENT IS FAIR. I THINK THAT’S WHAT HE IS ASKING FOR WHEN HE SAYS HE WANTS TO MEET WITH A JUDGE.

THE COURT: WELL, YOU ARE REPRESENTING YOURSELF. I DON’T THINK WE WANT TO NECESSARILY GET A SECOND OPINION. YOU EITHER AGREE TO THESE TERMS OR NOT BECAUSE THIS CASE IS SET FOR TRIAL; SO AT THIS LATE DATE NO, I WOULDN’T WANT TO DO THAT.

I CAN TELL YOU IN ALL LIKELIHOOD THAT – – WELL, I DON’T KNOW WHAT SOMEONE WOULD SAY AS FAR AS THE TERMS BECAUSE I HAVEN’T HEARD THE DETAILS, BUT WE WOULDN’T PROVIDE THAT. YOU WERE PREVIOUSLY REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. YOU HAVE CHOSEN TO REPRESENT YOURSELF HERE. I THINK YOU HAVE TO DECIDE WETHER THESE TERMS ARE ACCEPTABLE OR NOT.

SO WHY DON’T I TRAIL YOU. WOULD YOU MAKE A FEW PHONE CALLS. GIVE HIM THE FINAL TERMS, AND THEN I WILL GET BACK TO YOU SO I WILL TRAIL IT, PLEASE.

THANK YOU.

(BRIEF RECESS)

THE COURT: ON SINGH.

MS. WESTOVER: YES, YOUR HONOR. I MADE THE CALLS. WE GOT THE APPROVAL FOR THE NUMBERS. WE JUST INTERLINEATED THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT. THE PLAINTIFF HAS SIGNED IT. I JUST NOW NEED TO BRING IT OVER TO THE CAMPUS, AND WE ARE GOING TO REPRINT IT, HAVE NEW SIGNATURES ON ANY NEW DOCUMENTS.

THE COURT: YOU ARE AUTHORIZED TO – – YOU KNOW THAT THEY WILL SIGN IT?

MS. WESTOVER: YES.

THE COURT: OKAY. AND, DR. SINGH, YOU DID SIGN THE AGREEMENT – – SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT, AND YOU ARE SETTLING ON THOSE TERMS?

DR. SINGH: YES.

THE COURT: OKAY. ALL RIGHT. SO I’LL PUT THIS CASE ON A – – WE WILL PUT IT ON A 30-DAY DISMISSAL CALENDAR. IT WILL BE DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE TODAY, AND THEN I WILL EXPECT THE DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE IN 30 DAYS.

MS. WESTOVER: WE WILL HAVE IT PROBABLY BY NEXT WEEK, YOUR HONOR.

THE COURT: THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR RESOLVING THIS MATTER.

DR. SINGH: THANK YOU.

(PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED)

– – 000 – –”

The agreement and it terms amounted to nothing. There was a provision put into the agreement that allows any party, Defendant or myself, to discard the entire agreement for “any” reason, no explanations needed,

“3.14 If any provision of this Agreement is declared invalid, void or unenforceable for any reason, such provision shall be severed, to the extent possible, and the remaining provisions of the Agreement shall remain in full force and effect.”

Discarding everything prior to provision 3.14 left no agreement.

In any event, the law requires all proceedings/settlements/judgments to be thrown out because of fraud upon the court. Additionally, Caldwell v. Taylor, 218 Cal. 471 (1933) at 477: conduct that causes absence of necessary witnesses is extrinsic fraud. Ms. Taylor got caught at a local restaurant on October 21, 2005. Office of Diversity & Equity Equal Opportunity Specialist Ms. Taylor could have been testifying on October 21, 2005. Deceit practiced to prevent a fair contest/trial/settlement constitutes extrinsic fraud. When perpetrated in collaboration with officers of the court, it constitutes fraud upon the court. Caldwell at 479,

“the deceit practiced in the instant case was just as effective to prevent the proper presentation of the contest as if the plaintiff had been prevented from being present at the hearing.”

Judge Cowett refused to provide relief that should have been awarded at the August 12, 2005 Summary Judgment, i.e., reinstatement with tenure and promotion. Barriers operate to favor whites. California Court of Appeal panel mocked me for getting crippled.

The doctrine of Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944), echoed in Chewning v. Ford Motor Co., 354 S.C. 72, 83-84 (2003),

“Attorney fraud calls into question the integrity of the judiciary and erodes public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice. Accordingly, where an attorney embarks on a scheme to either suborn perjury or intentionally conceal documents, extrinsic fraud constituting a fraud upon the court occurs.”

“We note because fraud upon the court is an affront to the administration of justice, a litigant who has been defrauded need not establish prejudice. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., supra; Dixon v. Comm’n of Internal Revenue, 2003 WL 1216290 (9th Cir. 2003) (“ . . . the perpetrator of the fraud [upon the court] should not be allowed to dispute the effectiveness of the fraud after the fact.”).”

On pages 82-83, the Supreme Court of South Carolina, in Chewning, noted,

“…“(fabrication of evidence where attorney is implicated is fraud upon the court)”… “(“Since attorneys are officers of the court, their conduct, if dishonest, would constitute fraud on the court.”)”… (attorney subornation of perjury and false statements to trial court constitute fraud upon the court)”… see 12 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice 60-21[4][b] (3d ed. 2002.)”

Per California Civil Code section 1567, an apparent consent is not real or free when obtained through: "1. Duress; 2. Menace; 3. Fraud; 4. Undue influence; or 5. Mistake." See Keithley v. Civil Service Bd., 11 Cal.App.3d 443 (1970), O'Neil v. Spillane, 45 Cal.App.3d 147 (1975), Odorizzi v. Bloomfield School Dist., 246 Cal.App.2d 123 (1966). In Wells v. Zenz, 83 C.A.2d 137 140 (1927),

“Fraud is defined as a generic term which embraces all the multifarious means which human ingenuity can devise and are resorted to by one individual to get an advantage over another. No definite and invariable rule can be laid down as a general proposition defining fraud, and it includes all surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling, and unfair way by which another is deceived.”

Undue influence, for example, a species of fraud, is defined in Keithley v. Civil Service Bd., 11 Cal.App.3d 443 (1970) at 451,

“We observe further that direct evidence of undue influence is rarely obtainable and, thus the court is normally relegated to determination by inference from the totality of facts and circumstances.” … “Indeed, there are no fixed definitions or inflexible formulas. Rather, we are concerned with whether from the entire context it appears that one's will was overborne and he was induced to do or forbear to do an act which he would not do, or would do, if left to act freely.” …
“The appellate court observed that undue influence in the sense there concerned consisted of "persuasion which tends to be coercive in nature, persuasion which overcomes the will without convincing the judgment. [Citation.]" (At p. 130.) "The hallmark of such persuasion," said the court, "is high pressure, a pressure which works on mental, moral, or emotional weakness to such an extent that it approaches the boundaries of coercion. In this sense, undue influence has been called overpersuasion.” … “In essence, undue influence consists of the use of excessive pressure by a dominant person over a servient person resulting in the apparent will of the servient person being in fact the will of the dominant person. (Odorizzi v. Bloomfield School Dist., supra, at p. 131.)”

In my Complaint, Doc. No. 1, Exhibit 26 provides Appellant’s Reply Brief filed in Singh I. (See Complaint, Par. 57). It was submitted in November 2006 to the California Court of Appeals. I asked the Court of Appeals Panel to remand Singh I to a trier of facts charged with ascertaining the truth; to remand Singh I to a judge who would have said (at least by December 9, 2005) to Attorney Susan Westover, (Exhibit 26 of Complaint),

“TRIAL COURT: “COUNSEL, YOU STATED UNDER THE PENALTY OF PERJURY IN YOUR AFFIDAVIT THAT DR. SINGH ACTUALLY PRODUCED THE RED JULY 30, 1999 SDSU OFFICE OF DIVERSITY & EQUITY PROCEDURES FOR FACULTY RECRUITMENT AND HIRING HANDBOOK TO THE UNIVERSITY IN RESPONSE ITS REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION TO HIM.

DR. SINGH UNDER THE PENALTY OF PERJURY IN HIS AFFIDAVIT SAYS THAT YOU ARE LYING IN YOUR AFFIDAVIT.

COUNSEL, THIS COURT WANTS YOU TO PRODUCE THE RED JULY 30, 1999 SDSU OFFICE OF DIVERSITY & EQUITY PROCEDURES FOR FACULTY RECRUITMENT AND HIRING HANDBOOK SUPPOSEDLY PRODUCED BY DR. SINGH TO THE UNIVERSITY IN RESPONSE ITS REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION TO HIM.

I SEE THAT THE BAILIFF IS REACHING FOR HIS HANDCUFF’S TO PUT, EITHER ON YOU COUNSEL, OR DR. SINGH.””

Fraudulent hot air by Attorney Westover around November 20, 2006, as she informed the Court of Appeals Panel regarding the thrust of argument at the hearing, (Exhibit 27 of Complaint,)

“The University’s positions are fully briefed. Oral argument by CSU’s counsel will be limited to rebuttal of false or erroneous statements by Dr. Singh.”

On November 22, 2006 I informed the Court of Appeals Panel regarding the thrust of argument at the hearing, (Exhibit 28 of Complaint)

“FRAUD UPON THE COURT. AT THE ORAL ARGUMENT HEARING, RESPONDENT SHOULD PRODUCE THE RED JULY 30, 1999 SDSU OFFICE OF DIVERSITY & EQUITY PROCEDURES FOR FACULTY RECRUITMENT AND HIRING HANDBOOK SUPPOSEDLY PRODUCED BY APPELLANT TO THE UNIVERSITY IN RESPONSE ITS REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION TO HIM. SEE PAGE 38 OF APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF. ALSO SEE TABLE OF CONTENTS.”

Exhibit 29 of Complaint shows Defendant’s February 6, 2007 request for continuance of Oral Argument informing the judicial system that Attorney Westover will be vacationing with her husband’s law firm,

“I am taking a vacation to the State of Florida from March 7, 2007 through and including March 14, 2007. My vacation is pre-planned, pre-paid, and non-refundable. The trip is taken in conjunction with my husband’s law firm’s annual partner retreat, so I have no flexibility in the dates of the trip.”

After filing Appellant’s Reply Brief with the California Court of Appeals in Nov. 2006, the Court of Appeals was additionally reminded in Feb. 13, 2007 pleadings that, (Par. 61 of Complaint),

“In hiding unlawful fraudulent Attorney collusion, & concealing and tampering of evidence by Attorneys (also Fraud Upon the Court,) Attorney Westover lied and wrote to Trial Court under penalty of perjury that Appellant actually produced the red July 30, 1999 SDSU Office of Diversity & Equity Procedures for Faculty Recruitment and Hiring handbook to the University in response its request for production to him.”

I moved the Court of Appeals on March 1, 2007 to unearth fraud upon the court by ordering Attorney Westover as follows, (Par. 62 of Complaint),

Court Order: Present to the Appeal Court the red July 30, 1999 SDSU Office of Diversity & Equity Procedures for Faculty Recruitment and Hiring handbook supposedly produced by Appellant to the University in response its request for production to him.

It was a very simple request to unearth attorney fraud and eradicate discrimination and retaliation, but the Court of Appeals corruptly ordered the Court Clerk to return my March 1, 2007 pleadings unfiled. (Par. 63 of Complaint) The panel served as a quick shield. No responses had to be filed. Judge Sabraw was provided with details, including in paragraphs 57 to 65 of the Complaint, Doc. 1. Affluent clients and law firms engaging in Ku Klux Klannish conduct can be controlling and rewarding. Attorney Westover was again given the royal treatment at Oral Argument, (Par. 65 of Complaint),

WESTOVER: SUSAN WESTOVER. GOOD AFTERNOON. I BELIEVE MY BRIEF ADDRESSES THE ISSUES ON THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT QUITE THOROUGHLY SO IF THERE ARE UNLESS THERE

JUSTICE MCINTYRE: WHAT IS YOUR VIEW WHAT THE ISSUE ON APPEAL IS?

WESTOVER: THE ISSUE ON APPEAL IS WHETHER THERE IS A BINDING SETTLEMENT UNDER AND WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY ENFORCED IT UNDER 664.6

JUSTICE MCINTYRE: YES. ALL RIGHT. IS THERE OTHER LITIGATION THAT THAT MR. SINGH HAS INVOLVED WITH THIS, WITH THE UNIVERSITY OR AGAINST HIS LAWYER OR SOMEBODY ELSE.

WESTOVER: ABOUT A MONTH AND A HALF AGO HE FILED THIS EXACT SAME LAWSUIT AGAIN IN SUPERIOR COURT ALLEGING RETALIATION, DISCRIMINATION FOR DENAIL OF TENURE SO I AM JUST WAITING FOR THE OPINION ON THIS TO COME FROM THIS COURT TO HOPEFULLY GET THAT DISMISSED BUT HE IS REFILED IN SUPERIOR COURT THE SAME SUIT BUT HE HASN’T FILED ANYTHING AGAINST HIS FORMER COUNSEL.

JUSTICE MCINTYRE: ALL RIGHT.

JUSTICE MCDONALD: THANK YOU.

WESTOVER: THANK YOU.

Elementary fact-finding to seek the truth was considered unnecessary. Barriers operate to favor whites. Similarly, on June 8, 2007, Judge Richard E. L. Strauss was in league with Attorney Westover who committed criminal acts, (Paragraph 122 of Complaint),

SAN DIEGO, CALIFORNIA, FRIADAY, JUNE 8, 2007, 2:05 P.M.

HAZEL-ATLAS

But on May 10, 2007, I had filed properly and with proper notice, a Noticed Motion titled “NOTICE OF PLAINTIFF’S MOTION & MOTION FOR DOCUMENT PRODUCTION; UNEARTHING OF FRAUD UPON THE COURT; AND ERADICATION OF DISCRIMINATION AND RETALIATION”.

On June 8, 2007, Judge Strauss took my timely noticed motion filed on May 10, 2007 OFF THE CALENDAR. My motion was to be heard and ruled on June 22, 2007 at 1:30 PM but it was removed off the calendar. The timely filed motion was reproduced as Exhibit 44 of Complaint, Doc. 1.

On June 8, 2007, Judge Strauss also granted Defendants’ a date of August 31, 2007 so that Defendants’ could file their motion for judgment on the pleadings. On June 8, 2007 I informed Judge Strauss that I wanted an impartial court and wanted removal of Singh II to federal court. I removed Singh II from state court to federal court on August 14, 2007 and informed Defendant Strauss, Defendant Westover and Defendant Cleesattle. Defendant Strauss, a state judge, could not make any rulings after August 14, 2007. Rulings made by Defendant Strauss in Singh II past August 14, 2007 have no meaning. The ruling around August 30, 2007 by Defendant Strauss in favor of Defendants’ judgment on the pleadings has no weight. The ruling by Defendant Strauss declaring me to be a vexatious litigant etc. has no weight. In any event, Defendant Strauss knew I had no desire to litigate in the “state hall of corruption”, downtown, San Diego.

KKK would also declare that Dr. Martin Luther King was vexatious.

Defendants had plenty of notice that I was going to seek justice in federal court. I filed my suit in federal court on August 14, 2007 and was assigned Judge Dana M. Sabraw. Unfortunately Judge Sabraw is a past state judge. His wife Summer Sabraw is an Attorney in California. Magistrate Judge Barbara L. Major also did not punish perpetrators of Ku Klux Klannish conduct for trying to get the federal courts to declare me as a Vexatious litigant. Judge Sabraw continued to refuse my requests (Doc. 10 and Doc. 15) for recusal. Judge Sabraw dismissed the complaint on May 29, 2008 under F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6). On July 17, 2008 Judge Sabraw refused to vacate the judgment and allow amending of complaint for first time.

Prejudice is not an element of fraud upon the court. I also have a right to full and fair opportunity to litigate in absence of Ku Klux Klannish conduct by Officers of Court and Defendants who intentionally discriminate. Cal. Gov. Code 12940/12946, Title VI, Title VII, & Title IX evidence was unlawfully destroyed. My complaint to Ms. Taylor regarding gender discrimination against the most qualified female applicant was on April 10, 2003 and the investigation file spanned until at least May 2003. The investigation was quite malevolent. Ms. Taylor was aware that I was facing retaliation. Federally funded University was forced to invite female applicant for an interview.

Ms. Taylor’s files also included her meeting with Whistle-Blower Officer Dr. Popp and Defendant Dean Hayhurst after Dr. Popp felt that accusing the dean of discrimination is a serious allegation. Dr. Popp stated I was the top candidate in the college of engineering. Whites were granted early tenure and promotion even though the granting was without enthusiasm. The investigation was quite malevolent.

Ms. Taylor quit SDSU in September 2003. Federally funded University and in-house Attorney Westover, fraudulently accused Office of Diversity & Equity Equal Opportunity Specialist, law graduate Ms. Taylor of destroying all her case files, deleting all emails, changing passwords etc. etc. April 2003 to September 2003 is even less than 1 year. According to SDSU Office of Diversity & Equity procedures, records were to be kept by the Office of Diversity & Equity (ODE) for 2 years.

A judge that abides by the Supreme Authority of the United States would eradicate intentional discrimination by reinstating recipient of College of Engineering Outstanding Teacher award with tenure and promotion in tune with a) his department, b) his college, c) University Promotions and Tenure Review Panel, d) his contract, and e) Reeves, 530 U.S. 133 147 (2000).

3. What did you ask the district court to do (for example, award damages, give injunctive relief, etc.)?

I requested that the district court grant the following relief:
A. Court order Defendant Weber to immediately reinstate Plaintiff with Tenure and Promotion at a starting salary of $ 77,000.00 per year.
B. Court award Plaintiff compensatory and punitive damages.
C. Court penalizes all Defendants as the court deems just.
D. Plaintiff requests all equitable relief in tune with Pollard v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, (2001). Also see Pollard v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 412 F.3d 657, (2005).

4. State the claim or claims you raised at the district court.

CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT,
18 U.S.C. § 242, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1985,
DISCRIMINATION & RETALIATION,
FRAUD UPON THE COURT,
STEALING AND TAMPERING OF EVIDENCE BY ATTORNEYS

5. What issues are you raising on appeal?

Judge Sabraw stated in his November 13, 2007, Order granting motion to dismiss against defendants State Judges Patricia Cowett and Richard E. L. Strauss, California Court of Appeal Justices Alex McDonald, Cynthia Aaron, James McIntyre, California Attorney General Edmund G. Brown and Deputy Attorney General Jodi L. Cleesattle, (Doc. 8, page 2, line 24),

“On August 14, 2007, Plaintiff filed the instant action with this Court alleging misconduct by the moving Defendants, perpetrated during the litigation of Singh I and Singh II. (“Complaint,” Doc. 1).”

Judge Sabraw at page 3, line 24 of his November 13, 2007 Order, (Doc. 8),

“Plaintiff, citing Beard v. Udall, 648 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1981), asserts judicial immunity does not apply “if a judge connives with one of the parties to predetermine the outcome of a judicial proceeding.” (Opp. at 6). Beard, however, has been overruled. Sitting en banc, the Ninth Circuit held: “allegations that a conspiracy produced a certain decision should no more pierce the actor's immunity than allegations of bad faith, personal interest or outright malevolence.” Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1077-78 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc,).”

Ok, judges are immune from conspiring and malevolence. Perhaps California Attorney General Edmund G. Brown and his Deputy Jodi L. Cleesattle can also use “immunity” as a shield. However, the remaining Defendants are still liable to me in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress; such proceeding to be prosecuted in the several District or Circuit Courts of the United States, with and subject to the same rights of appeal, review upon error and other remedies provided in like cases in such courts, under the provisions of the act of the 9th of April, 1866, entitled "An Act to protect all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and to furnish the means of their vindication," and the other remedial laws of the United states which are in their nature applicable in such cases. See Civil Rights Act of 1871. Also see Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 28 (1980),

“Private persons, jointly engaged with state officials in the challenged action, are acting "under color" of law for purposes of 1983 actions. Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398, U.S. 144, 152, (1970); United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794, (1966).”

The district courts dismissal based on Rooker-Feldmen doctrine and res-judicata is willfully in error in this case where several white Attorneys (unlawful collusion between Plaintiff’s Attorneys and Defendants’ and their in-house Attorneys) assist and connive at fraud and intentional discrimination, state judges in league with the evil-doers, conspire with Attorneys and Defendants to deprive me of my constitutional rights.

Res-judicata assumes full and fair opportunity to litigate. Kougasian v. TMSL, INC., 359 F.3d 1136 1143 (2004). The ninth circuit in Kougasian guides district courts, regarding the applicability of Rooker-Feldmen, consistent with Caldwell v. Taylor 218 Cal. 471 (1933), Unites States v. Throckmorton 98 U.S. 61 (1878), Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co. 322 U.S. 238 (1944) and the various civil rights acts of the nation. Kougasian at 1141, summarized in a nutshell, that it has long been the law that a plaintiff in federal court can seek to set aside a state court judgment obtained through extrinsic fraud. Moreover, fraud perpetrated by officers of the court is extrinsic fraud, constituting fraud upon the court, and state and federal proceedings, settlements, judgments etc. have no meaning, as prejudice is not an element of fraud upon the court. Extrinsic fraud, fraud upon the court allow one to file suit in equity in the federal court which rendered the judgment or in a federal court other than the court, federal or state, which rendered it. See Hazel-Atlas, 322 U.S. 238, 259. The perpetrator of the fraud upon the court will not be allowed to dispute the effectiveness of the fraud. See Hazel-Atlas. Ku Klux Klannish conduct results in several forms of impairment and examples are given in Mitchum v. Foster 407 U.S. 225, 238 (1972),

“Sheriffs having eyes to see, see not; judges having ears to hear, hear not”

The district court knew better than to cite Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd., 465 U.S. 75 (1984). Petitioner Migra did not claim that State Court deprived her of full and fair opportunity to litigate. The court of Migra cited Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980). Allen addresses the right to full and fair opportunity to litigate. Also see Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306 (1983).

Cal. Gov. Code 12940/12946, Title VI, Title VII, & Title IX evidence was unlawfully destroyed. My complaint to Ms. Taylor regarding gender discrimination against the most qualified female applicant was on April 10, 2003 and the investigation file spanned until at least May 2003. Ms. Taylor was aware that I was facing retaliation. Federally funded University was forced to invite female applicant for an interview. Ms. Taylor’s files also included her meeting with Whistle-Blower Officer Dr. Popp and Defendant Dean Hayhurst after Dr. Popp felt that accusing the dean of discrimination is a serious allegation. Dr. Popp stated I was the top candidate. Whites were granted early tenure and promotion even though the granting was without enthusiasm. The investigation was quite malevolent. Ms. Taylor quit SDSU in September 2003. Federally funded University and in-house Attorney Westover, fraudulently accused Office of Diversity & Equity Equal Opportunity Specialist, law graduate Ms. Taylor of destroying all her case files, deleting all emails, changing passwords etc. etc. According to SDSU Office of Diversity & Equity procedures, records were to be kept by Office of Diversity & Equity (ODE) for 2 years. My attorneys stole/kept my red SDSU Handbook regarding Office of Diversity & Equity procedures which stated that records were to kept by the Office of Diversity & Equity (ODE) for 2 years.

My attorneys returned to me a fraudulently fabricated red Handbook stating that search records should be kept for 1 year. Exhibit 51 of Complaint that has been removed from district courts docket is attached to this brief as Exhibit 5. Exhibit 51 submitted August 14, 2007 with the Complaint to the district court is a Xeroxed B&W copy of the fraudulent red handbook fabricated by Officers of Court and Defendants who intentionally discriminate and engage in Ku Klux Klannish conduct. Complaint, Doc. 1, Paragraph 128. Exhibit 51 of Complaint shows the fraudulent scheme by my Attorneys in unlawful collusion with Defendants and their in-house Attorneys to conceive and fabricate fraudulent evidence. My rights under Sec. 1981 are protected against impairment by both nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of State law. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(c). Also see 18 U.S.C. § 242 and the Civil Rights Laws of our nation. I have a right to judges and courts that do not think like or serve perpetrators of Ku Klux Klannish conduct.

Please remove barriers operating to favor whites that should have been removed at the August 12, 2005 summary judgment, stop this high-tech lynching, and reinstate me immediately with tenure and promotion in tune with a) my department, b) my college, c) my University Promotions, Tenure and Review Panel, d) my contract and e) Reeves, 530 U.S. 133 147 (2000).

Federally funded Defendants and California Officers of Court including Attorneys Joel Golden and Jeremy Golden perpetrate crime and fraud, engage in Ku Klux Klannish conduct and assist and connive at intentional discrimination. Please provide additional relief at this Court of Appeals or the case can be remanded back to a different judge at the southern district court or another different district court.

6. Did you present all these issues to the district court?
Yes & No If not, why?

Presenting the issues is not sufficient. Ku Klux Klannish conduct can result in several forms of impairment. For example, Judge Sabraw on November 13, 2007, (Doc. No. 8, p. 4, lines 3-5)

“The essence of Plaintiff’s claims are based on the following allegations: (1) the moving Defendants were aware that a University attorney “fraudulently accused” another employee of destroying case files relevant to Singh I and Singh II. (Compl. ¶ 33);”

Actually, SDSU and in-house Attorney Susan Westover “fraudulently accused” SDSU’s in-house Equal Opportunity Specialist. Complaint ¶ 33 is much more revealing,

“33. Judges Cowett, McDonald, Aaron, McIntyre and Strauss, along with the California Department of Justice, are also aware that SDSU and in-house Attorney, Susan Westover, in February 2005, fraudulently accused SDSU’s in-house Equal Opportunity Specialist, Janice M. Taylor, a law school graduate, of unlawfully destroying all her case files that were supposed to be safely kept for 2 years, including Plaintiff’s April 10, 2003 complaint and subsequent investigation file regarding gender discrimination against a highly qualified female applicant with 28 patents, 40 journal papers and 100 conference papers. See Exhibits 10-12. In Exhibit 12, Dr. Bonnie Zimmerman is the SDSU Whistle-Blower officer reporting to Defendant Weber.”

It would have been straightforward for a judge that abides by the Supreme Authority of the United States to eradicate intentional discrimination by writing a simple order such as given below,

“ORDER: Singh has been deprived of a full and fair opportunity to litigate. The recipient of the College of Engineering Outstanding Teacher award is reinstated with tenure and promotion in tune with a) his department, b) his college, c) his University Promotions, Tenure and Review Panel, d) his contract, and e) Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 147 (2000).

When federally protected rights are invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief. Additional relief provided in tune with Pollard, 532 U.S. 843, (2001) and Pollard, 412 F.3d 657, (2005) is as follows ……”

7. What law supports these issues on appeal? (You may, but need not, refer to cases and statues.)

The court of Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, 544 U.S. 167 (2005),

“Because Jackson's Title IX claim was dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, "we must assume the truth of the material facts as alleged in the complaint." Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322, 325 (1991). …

At this stage of the proceedings, "[t]he issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974). Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”

Moreover, the teachings of Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 681 (1946),

“Whether or not the complaint as drafted states a common law action in trespass made actionable by state law, it is clear from the way it was drawn that petitioners seek recovery squarely on the ground that respondents violated the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. It charges that the respondents conspired to do acts prohibited by these amendments, and alleges that respondents' conduct pursuant to the conspiracy resulted in damages in excess of $3,000. It cannot be doubted, therefore, that it was the pleaders' purpose to make violation of these Constitutional provisions the basis of this suit. Before deciding that there is no jurisdiction, the district court must look to the way the complaint is drawn to see if it is drawn so as to claim a right to recover under the Constitution and laws of the United States. For, to that extent,
"the party who brings a suit is master to decide what law he will rely upon, and . . . does determine whether he will bring a 'suit arising under' the . . . [Constitution or laws] of the United States by his declaration or bill."
The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 228 U.S. 25. Though the mere failure to set out the federal or Constitutional claims as specifically as petitioners have done would not always be conclusive against the party bringing the suit, where the complaint, as here, is so drawn as to seek recovery directly under the Constitution or laws of the United States, the federal court, but for two possible exceptions later noted, must entertain the suit. Thus, allegations far less specific than the ones in the complaint before us have been held adequate to show that the matter in controversy arose under the Constitution of the United States. Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58, 179 U.S. 64-65; Swafford v. Templetion, 185 U.S. 487, 185 U.S. 491-492. The reason for this is that the court must assume jurisdiction to decide whether the allegations state a cause of action on which the court can grant relief, as well as to determine issues of fact arising in the controversy.
Jurisdiction, therefore, is not defeated, as respondents seem to contend, by the possibility that the averments might fail to state a cause of action on which petitioners could actually recover. For it is well settled that the failure to state a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits, and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction. Whether the complaint states a cause of action on which relief could be granted is a question of law, and, just as issues of fact, it must be decided after, and not before, the court has assumed jurisdiction over the controversy. If the court does later exercise its jurisdiction to determine that the allegations in the complaint do not state a ground for relief, then dismissal of the case would be on the merits, not for want of jurisdiction. Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U.S. 487, 185 U.S. 493-494; Binderup v. Pathe Exchange, 263 U.S. 291, 263 U.S. 305-308. [Footnote 2] The previously carved out exceptions are that a suit may sometimes be dismissed for want of jurisdiction where the alleged claim under the Constitution or federal statutes clearly appears to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction, or where such a claim is wholly insubstantial and frivolous. The accuracy of calling these dismissals jurisdictional has been questioned. The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., supra, 228 U.S. at 228 U.S. 25. But cf. Swafford v. Templeton, supra.”

At pg. 684 of Bell,

And it is established practice for this Court to sustain the jurisdiction of federal courts to issue injunctions to protect rights safeguarded by the Constitution, [Footnote 4] and to restrain individual state officers from doing what the 14th Amendment forbids the state to do. [Footnote 5] Moreover, where federally protected rights have been invaded, it has been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief. [Footnote 6] And it is also well settled that, where legal rights have been invaded and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done. [Footnote 7]

The teaching of Conley v Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), re-iterated in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974),

When a federal court reviews the sufficiency of a complaint, before the reception of any evidence either by affidavit or admissions, its task is necessarily a limited one. The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Indeed, it may appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely, but that is not the test. Moreover, it is well established that, in passing on a motion to dismiss, whether on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or for failure to state a cause of action, the allegations of the complaint should be construed favorably to the pleader.
"In appraising the sufficiency of the complaint we follow, of course, the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (157) (footnote omitted).

Scheuer at pg. 237

“Analyzing the complaints in light of these precedents, we see that petitioners allege facts that demonstrate they are seeking to impose individual and personal liability on the named defendants for what they claim -- but have not yet established by proof -- was a deprivation of federal rights by these defendants under color of state law. Whatever the plaintiffs may or may not be able to establish as to the merits of their allegations, their claims, as stated in the complaints, given the favorable reading required by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Consequently, the District Court erred in dismissing the complaints for lack of jurisdiction.”

Scheuer at page 243,

In Monroe v. Pape, supra, MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, writing for the Court, held that the section in question was meant "to give a remedy to parties deprived of constitutional rights, privileges and immunities by an official's abuse of his position." 365 U.S. at 172. Through the Civil Rights statutes, Congress intended
"to enforce provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment against those who carry a badge of authority of a State and represent it in some capacity, whether they act in accordance with their authority or misuse it."

Federal civil rights laws are remedial in nature, especially when it comes to intentional discrimination in employment. When state court proceedings are being done in bad faith, when state judges think like or serve perpetrators of Ku Klux Klannish conduct, I can remove my pending unfinished case Singh II from state court to a federal district court. The Civil Rights Act of 1871, also known as the KKK Act of 1871, (Section 1),

AN ACT to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the constitution of the United States and other purposes. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
That any person who, under color of any law, statue, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any of any State, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any person within the jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States, shall, any such law, statue, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of the State to the contrary notwithstanding, be liable to the party injured in any action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress; such proceeding to be prosecuted in the several District or Circuit Courts of the United States, with and subject to the same rights of appeal, review upon error and other remedies provided in like cases in such courts, under the provisions of the act of the 9th of April, 1866, entitled "An Act to protect all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and to furnish the means of their vindication," and the other remedial laws of the United states which are in their nature applicable in such cases.

Moreover, in Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306 313 (1983),

“In federal actions, including § 1983 actions, a state court judgment will not be given collateral estoppel effect, however, where
"the party against whom an earlier court decision is asserted did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim or issue decided by the first court."”

In Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 100 (1980),

“In reviewing the legislative history of § 1983 in Monroe v. Pape, supra, the Court inferred that Congress had intended a federal remedy in three circumstances: where state substantive law was facially unconstitutional, where state procedural law was inadequate to allow full litigation of a constitutional claim, and where state procedural law, though adequate in theory, was inadequate in practice. 365 U.S. at 365 U.S. 173-174. In short, the federal courts could step in where the state courts were unable or unwilling to protect federal rights. Id. at 365 U.S. 176. This understanding of § 1983 might well support an exception to res judicata and collateral estoppel where state law did not provide fair procedures for the litigation of constitutional claims, or where a state court failed to even acknowledge the existence of the constitutional principle on which a litigant based his claim. Such an exception, however, would be essentially the same as the important general limit on rules of preclusion that already exists: collateral estoppel does not apply where the party against whom an earlier court decision is asserted did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim or issue decided by the first court.”

Justice Blackmun, with whom Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall joined in dissent in Allen, felt even stronger about the role of the federal courts. In Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 61 (1972),

“Nor, in any event, may the State's trial court procedure be deemed constitutionally acceptable simply because the State eventually offers a defendant an impartial adjudication. Petitioner is entitled to a neutral and detached judge in the first instance.”

Also see Republican Party of Minnesota Et Al. v. White, Chairperson, Minnesota Board of Judicial Standards, et al. 536 U.S. 765 776 (2001).

The teachings of Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398, U.S. 144, 156, (1970), have been around since 1970,

“Petitioner, in opposing summary judgment, pointed out that respondent had failed in its moving papers to dispute the allegation in petitioner's complaint, a statement at her deposition,[Footnote 13] and an unsworn statement by a Kress employee,[Footnote 14] all to the effect that there was a policeman in the store at the time of the refusal to serve her, and that this was the policeman who subsequently arrested her. Petitioner argued that although she had no knowledge of an agreement between Kress and the police, the sequence of events created a substantial enough possibility of a conspiracy to allow her to proceed to trial, especially given the fact that the non-circumstantial evidence of the conspiracy could only come from adverse witnesses. Further, she submitted an affidavit specifically disputing the manager's assertion that the situation in the store at the time of the refusal was "explosive," thus creating an issue of fact as to what his motives might have been in ordering the refusal of service.
We think that on the basis of this record, it was error to grant summary judgment. As the moving party, respondent had the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact, and for these purposes the material it lodged must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opposing party.[Footnote 15] Respondent here did not carry its burden because of its failure to foreclose the possibility that there was a policeman in the Kress store while petitioner was awaiting service, and that this policeman reached an understanding with some Kress employee that petitioner not be served.
It is true that Mr. Powell, the store manager, claimed in his deposition that he had not seen or communicated with a policeman prior to his tacit signal to Miss Baggett, the supervisor of the food counter. But respondent did not submit any affidavits from Miss Baggett,[Footnote 16] or from Miss Freeman,[Footnote 17] the waitress who actually refused petitioner service, either of whom might well have seen and communicated with a policeman in the store. Further, we find it particularly noteworthy that the two officers involved in the arrest each failed in his affidavit to foreclose the possibility (1) that he was in the store while petitioner was there; and (2) that, upon seeing petitioner with Negroes, he communicated his disapproval to a Kress employee, thereby influencing the decision not to serve petitioner.
Given these unexplained gaps in the materials submitted by respondent, we conclude that respondent failed to fulfill its initial burden of demonstrating what is a critical element in this aspect of the case - that there was no policeman in the store. If a policeman were present, we think it would be open to a jury, in light of the sequence that followed, to infer from the circumstances that the policeman and a Kress employee had a "meeting of the minds" and thus reached an understanding that petitioner should be refused service. Because "[o]n summary judgment the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts contained in [the moving party's] materials must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion," United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962), we think respondent's failure to show there was no policeman in the store requires reversal.”

Unites States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61 (1878) indicated that a litigant has a right to an impartial system in which attorneys and judges are not false in their duty to it; right to a system where attorneys or judges do not assist or connive at the fraud. Caldwell at 476 following the teachings of Throckmorton states extrinsic fraud is where the attorney regularly employed corruptly sells out his client’s interest to the other side.

The perpetrator of fraud upon the court is not allowed to dispute the effectiveness of the fraud after-the-fact. The doctrine of Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944), was mentioned on page 17 of this brief. In Hazel-Atlas, at the time of the trial in the District Court in 1929, Hazel and its attorneys were aware that Hartford agents, attorneys and collaborators had fraudulently thought, conceived and authored an article to their advantage. Hazel did not make an issue of it. Hazel lost to Hartford in Circuit Court around May 1932. Hazel, in 1932, instead of filing a petition for rehearing in the Circuit Court, entered into settlement agreements with Hartford, and received benefits resulting from the agreements. Some ten years later, Hazel filed a petition in Circuit Court praying that the 1932 judgments against it be vacated and for such other relief as might be just. The Circuit Court denied relief reasoning that the fraud had not been effective to influence its earlier decision, and among other things, Hazel had been negligent and guilty of inexcusable delay in presenting the matter to the court. All parties including Hazel had been fully heard in the District & Circuit Courts. Regardless, prejudice is not an element of fraud upon the court and the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Circuit Court. Since then, courts have followed the doctrine of Hazel-Atlas. See for example, Dixon, 316 F.3d 1041, 1046. Hazel-Atlas leaves no room for discretion, which in this case would yield the same result.

Judges have been informed that discretion in discrimination cases is controlled by Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975),

“Congress' purpose in vesting a variety of "discretionary" powers in the courts was not to limit appellate review of trial courts, or to invite inconsistency and caprice, but rather to make possible the "fashion[ing] [of] the most complete relief possible."”

The only decision in intentional discrimination cases is to provide relief. In Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, 544 U.S. 167, (2005),

“Title IX prohibits sex discrimination by recipients of federal education funding. The statute provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 20 U. S. C. §1681(a). More than 25 years ago, in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 690-693 (1979), we held that Title IX implies a private right of action to enforce its prohibition on intentional sex discrimination. In subsequent cases, we have defined the contours of that right of action. In Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60 (1992), we held that it authorizes private parties to seek monetary damages for intentional violations of Title IX. We have also held that the private right of action encompasses intentional sex discrimination in the form of a recipient's deliberate indifference to a teacher's sexual harassment of a student, Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290-291 (1998), or to sexual harassment of a student by another student, Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Ed., 526 U.S. 629, 642 (1999).

In all of these cases, we relied on the text of Title IX, which, subject to a list of narrow exceptions not at issue here, broadly prohibits a funding recipient from subjecting any person to "discrimination" "on the basis of sex." 20 U. S. C. §1681. Retaliation against a person because that person has complained of sex discrimination is another form of intentional sex discrimination encompassed by Title IX's private cause of action. Retaliation is, by definition, an intentional act. It is a form of "discrimination" because the complainant is being subjected to differential treatment. See generally Olmstead v. L. C., 527 U.S. 581, 614 (1999) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (the "normal definition of discrimination" is "differential treatment"); see also Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 682, n. 22 (1983) (discrimination means "less favorable" treatment). Moreover, retaliation is discrimination "on the basis of sex" because it is an intentional response to the nature of the complaint: an allegation of sex discrimination. We conclude that when a funding recipient retaliates against a person because he complains of sex discrimination, this constitutes intentional "discrimination" "on the basis of sex," in violation of Title IX.”

Also see Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60 (1992).

Independent of any doctrine stated above, the Civil Rights Remedies Equalization Act of 1986 at 42 U.S.C. 2000d7 provides,

(a) General provision
(1) A State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of the Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal court for a violation of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 [29 U.S.C. 794], title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 [20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.], the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 [42 U.S.C. 6101 et seq.], title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.], or the provisions of any other Federal statute prohibiting discrimination by recipients of Federal financial assistance.
(2) In a suit against a State for a violation of a statute referred to in paragraph (1), remedies (including remedies both at law and in equity) are available for such a violation to the same extent as such remedies are available for such a violation in the suit against any public or private entity other than a State.
(b) Effective date
The provisions of subsection (a) of this section shall take effect with respect to violations that occur in whole or in part after October 21, 1986.

I, an American, have same rights as white citizens. I am deprived of full and fair opportunity to litigate. I have a right to judges and courts that do not think like or serve perpetrators of Ku Klux Klannish conduct. Cal. Gov. Code 12940/12946, Title VI, Title VII, & Title IX evidence was unlawfully destroyed. My complaint regarding gender discrimination against the most qualified female applicant was on April 10, 2003 and the investigation file spanned until at least May 2003. The investigation was quite malevolent. Ms. Taylor was aware that I was facing retaliation. Federally funded University was forced to invite female applicant for an interview. Ms. Taylor’s files also included her meeting with Whistle-Blower Officer Dr. Popp and Defendant Dean Hayhurst after Dr. Popp felt that accusing the dean of discrimination is a serious allegation. Dr. Popp stated I was the top candidate. Whites were granted early tenure and promotion even though the granting was without enthusiasm. The investigation was quite malevolent. Ms. Taylor quit SDSU in September 2003. Federally funded University and in-house Attorney Westover, fraudulently accused Office of Diversity & Equity Equal Opportunity Specialist, law graduate Ms. Taylor of destroying all her case files, deleting all emails, changing passwords etc. etc. April 2003 to September 2003 is even less than 1 year. According to SDSU Office of Diversity & Equity procedures, records were to be kept by Office of Diversity & Equity (ODE) for 2 years.

The teachings of Reeves, 530 U.S. 133 147 (2000),

“… it is permissible for the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of discrimination from the falsity of the employer's explanation. Specifically, we stated:

Please remove barriers operating to favor whites that should have been removed at the August 12, 2005 summary judgment, end this high-tech lynching, and reinstate recipient of College of Engineering Outstanding Teaching Award with tenure and promotion in tune with a) my department, b) my college, c) my University Promotions, Tenure and Review Panel, d) my contract and e) Reeves, 530 U.S. 133 147 (2000).

Please provide relief in tune with Pollard v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, (2001) and Pollard v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 412 F.3d 657, (2005) at this Court of Appeals or the case can be remanded back to a different judge at the southern district court or a different district court.

8. Do you have any other cases pending in this court? If so, give the name and docket number of each case. Answer => NO.

9. Have you filed any previous cases which have been decided by this court? If so, give the name and docket number of each case. Answer => NO.

10. For prisoners, did you exhaust all administrative remedies for each claim prior to filling your complaint in the district court? Answer => Not Applicable.

Sept. 2, 2008                                  s/ Rahul Singh
___________________ _______________________________
DATE                                      SIGNATURE: Rahul Singh
                                                     ADDRESS: 9974 Scripps Ranch Blvd, #230
                                                     San Diego, CA 92131
                                                     Tel: 619-392-3759
                                                     E-mail: Plaintiff@titlevii.org

Plaintiff's Motion/Application for Recusal Under 28 U.S.C. Section 455.

Judge Dana M. Sabraw, Past State Judge, Denies Plaintiff's Motion for Recusal. (No Hearings)

August 14, 2007 Federal Complaint.